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In this critical account of Baldacchino’s broad proposal for an emotion-focused
phenomenological-psychoanalytic account of ethno-national identity in his article
‘The eidetic of belonging’, I focus my evaluation on three central features that
might, even when treated separately, advance contemporary understanding of
group self-conceptions and emotion. The ﬁrst is that aﬀect (emotion or sentiment)
should play a central role in understanding ethno-national identity. The second is
that collective emotion should be prominent as a kind of social glue in the forma-
tion and maintenance of ethno-national identity (including complex relations
between diﬀerent ethno-national groups). The third is that a psychoanalytic phe-
nomenology of collective emotion addresses limitations that beset conceptions of
ethno-national aﬀective subjectivity: particularly, the idea that it is useful to replace
representations of irrational and dangerous ethno-national emotion with a new and
elaborate theoretical vocabulary of relationships between ego-objects and
we-images.
While all three positions can be argued to be present already in the ethno-
national identity literature, it is the arguments supporting each feature and an
evaluation of the resulting gestalt that will be critically examined to determine
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whether a conceptual advance (rather than a less than convincing interdisciplinary
convergence of ideas) has indeed been achieved. The ﬁrst highlighted feature of the
proposal is addressed by discussing the place for aﬀect in theoretical or critically
descriptive accounts in which emotions about one’s own and other collectives are
internally related to the experience of group identity. A central question is whether
the emotional foreground of group identity can be emphasized without its equiv-
ocation to the background of relations and practices. The second is explored by
arguing for the need to assemble detailed reminders of the phenomenology of
collective emotion and its limits. The third is evaluated by considering how further
coherent insights into ethno-national aﬀective identity can accrue by examining the
multiple objects of emotions such as collective pride, without adopting a founda-
tional, non-reﬂexive account of identity (Brown and Stenner, 2009).
The place of affect in understandings of ethno-national
identity emotion
Representations of emotion and aﬀect have been transformed from a marginalized
position in the mid-20th century to their current central position in many of the
practices, encounters and places constituting personal and public life (Ahmed,
2004; Parkinson et al., 2005; Thrift, 2004). Pace Baldacchino, simplistic hydraulic
accounts of emotion have been overturned by thorough neuroscientiﬁc research.
Moreover, social and cultural theorists (e.g., Probyn, 2005) have demonstrated
genuine multidisciplinary in their openness to the theories and ﬁndings of non-
reductive neuroscience. In such a context, when a new theoretical framework such
as Baldacchino’s implies that emotion can be invoked ubiquitously as an explana-
tion of the dynamics that underpin multitudinous cultural and social phenomena, it
is important to overlook the dismissive caricature of contemporary ‘neo-hydrau-
listic’ psychology to examine further details and provide detailed counter-examples.
In the case of the phenomenological-psychoanalytic account, central importance
is given to collective emotion. But what exactly is collective emotion? Several pos-
sibilities are immediately apparent: (1) people’s emotions about the ethno-national
collective or collectives they identify with (or which they can be identiﬁed as
part of) as well as those individuals with whom they do not identify (e.g. we’re
proud not to be like them); (2) emotions that are widely shared and regarded as
having collective manifestations even though the object or target of the emotion is
not necessarily the same (e.g. people’s individual thoughts, feelings and memories
about ‘what makes our nation or ethnic group special’, which may have public
manifestations or an origin in collective celebrations, moral-emotional climates, or
widely shared attachments); and (3) emotions that are demonstrated by collectives
(e.g. in public spaces) where reactions are the same (or similar) and the target or
object of emotion is the same (e.g. at least one half of the crowd’s reaction to a
televised game at a public viewing site).
The possible combinations (by no means mapped out or completed by possibil-
ities (1) to (3); cf. Smith et al., 2007) are complex and do not easily ﬁt into even the
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most elegant abstraction. For example, while the Cronulla riots in Sydney (a site
and source of collective emotion Baldacchino mentions) were engaged in and wit-
nessed ﬁrst-hand in forms (2) and (3), reactions of shame, disgust and concern were
also experienced in forms (1) and (2) by Australians and non-Australians. This
includes people’s own reactions to what they saw on television along with their
imaginings of the reactions of other local and international communities. A crucial
question for the phenomenological-psychoanalytic account is what speciﬁc claims
can be made about one or more of these diﬀerent forms of collective emotion and
their interrelations (i.e. apart from rejecting a foundational role for individual or
group shame or guilt as the predominant drivers of the aﬀective economy in many
collectives)?
It seems that the individualism of form (1) is not central even though empha-
sizing phenomenological experience foregrounds the experiencing ego or subject’s
complex relationship to broader social groups and an even more complex relation-
ship to emotional objects or targets. However, sensitivity to feelings and sensations
that become fully ﬂedged emotions when they are experienced and identiﬁed within
symbolic and discursive systems does not necessarily require a self-contradictory
stance in which emotions are discussed in unemotional ways. For example,
Branscombe and Doosje (2004) confront this issue when they note that ‘because
collective guilt is a psychological experience, it need not involve actually being
guilty in any sense of the word’ (2004: 3). Collective guilt therefore appears to be
just one of many peculiar collective sentiments that have an uncertain status (e.g.
ineﬀable, intangible, ontologically emergent) because sometimes there seems to be
an underlying collective feeling and it does not occur because the individual feels
personally responsible for crimes against others (and hence cannot be managed, for
example, by a personal apology). Such details are not adequately discussed by
Baldacchino although there is clearly the potential to do so.
At best, then, collective guilt and many other similar phenomena could be
described and analysed in terms of what Anderson (2009) calls an ‘aﬀective atmo-
sphere’. However, before examining the details and relevance of Anderson’s pro-
posal and the possibility of including both aﬀect and emotion in a coherent account
of collective emotion, the diﬀerences between emotion and aﬀect that are not clear
in Baldacchino’s account need to be clariﬁed. The emphasis on aﬀect is typically
described as part of the ‘aﬀective turn’ that has superseded the ‘‘linguistic turn’ in
social and cultural theory. It seems reasonable to claim that this debate is yet to
have an impact on mainstream emotion theory and research in the human sciences
and, for that reason, it is still located at the leading edge of theorizing in psychol-
ogy (e.g. Brown and Stenner (2009) describe how a Spinozian account of aﬀect is
one part of a reﬂexive and non-foundational psychosocial approach). It is also fair
to say that mainstream emotion researchers and theorists are still struggling with
(or more simply, continuing to avoid) the implications of the turn to language as
presented for over 30 years in the form of Wittgensteinian and neo-Wittgensteinian
philosophy, social constructionism and robust theoretical and empirical versions of
discursive psychology.
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A common way of distinguishing between aﬀect and emotion is to argue that the
former has a broader focus on the supra- or pre-personal and trans-personal fea-
tures of emotion. Thrift’s (2004) picture of emotion, for example, is in stark con-
trast to many emotion accounts that emphasize aﬀect only when it is ultimately
conscious and present as an eﬀect in its superﬁcial and speciﬁcally individual and
embodied emotional forms. Addressing aﬀect studies, Thrift writes:
It is extremely important to note that none of these approaches could be
described as based on a notion of human individuals coming together in community.
Rather, in line with my earlier work, each cleaves to an ‘inhuman’ or ‘transhuman’
framework in which individuals are generally understood as eﬀects of the events to
which their body parts (broadly understood) respond and in which they participate.
(2004: 59)
On this view, developmental psychology about national and ethnic identity
could be rethought as the progression (or failure) of bodies to shift and transform
from one form of relationality to other multiple, complex forms. However, it seems
more useful to consider how aﬀective atmospheres could be used to understand
how the ‘singular aﬀective qualities that are atmospheres – homely, serene, erotic’
that might form around ethno-national identities are ‘quasiautonomous’; that is,
even ‘if atmospheres proceed from and are created by bodies, they are not, how-
ever, reducible to them’ (Thrift, 2004: 4).
But what the aﬀective turn, therefore, gains in terms of depth – meaning the
potential to reference ‘deep and often unconscious organismic processes’ (Brown
and Stenner, 2009: 111) – it potentially loses in terms of coherence, conceptual
rigour and speciﬁcity. Other discourses of feelings, senses, climates and moods are
also appropriate, although there is a danger that such expressions can stretch
notions of aﬀect beyond their useful limits (i.e. that particular collective sentiments
can be seen to have eﬀects everywhere, even when not immediately apparent).
Further detail is needed to chart speciﬁc collective emotions, their relations to
each other, and the limits of their respective inter- and extra-emotional inﬂuences.
For example, Massumi (1995) argues that that collective aﬀects become real when
they have a greater impact on an economy than what are typically posited as the
underlying economic factors:
The ability of aﬀect to produce an economic eﬀect more swiftly and surely than
economics itself means that aﬀect is itself a real condition, an intrinsic variable of
the late-capitalist system, as infrastructural as a factory. Actually, it is beyond infra-
structural, it is everywhere, in eﬀect. Its ability to come second-hand, to switch
domains and produce eﬀects across them all, gives it a meta-factorial ubiquity. It is
beyond infrastructural. It is transversal. (1995: 106–7)
It will be crucial to see where speciﬁc collective emotions (in whichever exact
form) have these real eﬀects (i.e. even though economists continue to describe very
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speciﬁc examples, such as the eﬀect of national pride from hosting a FIFA World
Cup in a country such as South Africa, as an intangible beneﬁt).
Detailed reminders of the phenomenology of
collective emotion
In Baldacchino’s psychoanalytic-phenomenological account, unqualiﬁed intensity
is a central feature of aﬀect because it forms a dimension along which the ‘circuit of
belonging’ or feelings of solidarity are manifest in reactions with implications for
ethno-national identity. For this reason it appears that collective emotions that are
not reducible to individual experience (or its body) appear to provide a new
grounding for an account that, I shall argue, has some of the problematic features
of older ones. For example, intensity is revealed to be a complex state in which the
resulting feeling or emotion has an object and particular features, ostensibly cap-
tured by love (positivity, attraction) and hate (negativity, avoidance/withdrawal).
Moreover, a self, subject, or ego must be invoked because intense feelings are often
internally related to inner-outer pictures of experience (which then need to have
boundaries or folds), strong feelings are described and expressed in terms of per-
sistent notions of personal depth or the intensity and strength of feelings function
as criteria for commitment to an identity.
This is not to reject the idea that collectives of bodies in encounters can generate
aﬀects, sensations, reactions, alignments and feelings that might become corporeal
and personal candidates for particular emotions in a given symbolic order. However,
it is problematic when a reaction positions an individual in relation to others in such
a way that the emotional foreground and emotional or non-emotional background
of social practices, processes, structures or forms of life are equivocated. In contrast,
Woodward (2000) shows how shame is a social emotion that ‘is not only interiorized
psychologically, but also circulates widely in contemporary culture’ (2000: 212–13).
It is shaming practices as well as propensities to shame that occur against the back-
ground of broader relationships and inequalities. Scheﬀ ’s (2002) work on shame is
described in support of the psychoanalytic-phenomenological account because talk-
ing about shame could alleviate its other manifestations (e.g. rage), a point that
Baldacchino suggests is progressive because identity aﬀects can change while identity
qua formal collective property remains the same.
Baldacchino’s point that the origin of those feelings has not been explained is a
good one, but much more is required than the assembly of connections to similar
narratives to provide a convincing argument that the collective emotions must be
their foundation. Non-emotional and emotional practices (economic activities,
media representations, public spaces) aﬀord ﬂows of propensities toward emotions
and regulation of other feelings. In addition to the earlier passing reference to
collective guilt, it is worth making similar points about collective pride because
this is very much the territory of aﬀective ethno-national identity that needs a
conceptual surview. For example, just as personal responsibility (and personal
reparation) is not intrinsic to experiencing the feeling of collective guilt, collective
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pride can also circulate between people in ways that can feel inclusive as they
simultaneously create new boundaries and zones of exclusion (Sullivan, 2007).
This can explain the ambivalence, the guilty pleasure of the middle-class, pro-
multicultural and educated citizen towards the enjoyment of national victories
(and the nagging feeling that someone, somewhere is excluded or oﬀended by
exuberant celebrations). There is also aﬀect, dimly acknowledged, such as an
uncomfortable feeling of being in a place where one does not belong or interactions
with someone who is too diﬀerent or ‘other’ (e.g. reversals of power and feeling ‘out
of one’s depth’). In such instances, a phenomenologically adequate account should
mean that one can be surprised by one’s own reactions and experience mixed
emotions that are complex and diﬃcult to articulate (e.g. such as harbouring an
attraction towards the very object of hatred and devaluation). An overarching
distinction between love and hate, therefore, does little to promote understanding
of complex ambivalence of the type that might be introduced here as collective
mixed emotions (i.e. the type of analysis that is found in very good contemporary
psychosocial and psychoanalytic analyses).
Ego-objects, we-images and the non-foundational approach
One of the central implications of a recent book by Brown and Stenner (2009) is
that psychology can provide coherent insights about topics such as ethno-national
identity without producing a further foundational and non-reﬂexive account. In
other words, it may be possible to avoid grounding identity in something essential,
something new. Whether incorporating psychoanalytical and phenomenological
perspectives adds value to contemporary accounts without attempting to restore
an updated unconscious foundation to ethno-national identity cannot be ade-
quately addressed here. However, even though few of the theorists who rethink
emotion in aﬀective, relational and embodied forms currently favour the extensive
inclusion of psychoanalytic concepts (e.g. Anderson, 2009; Brown and Stenner,
2009; Massumi, 1995; Thrift, 2004), Hook’s response to Baldacchino’s article dem-
onstrates that there are important insights to be gathered from recent psychody-
namic analyses. But I want to argue further that the appeal of a position such as
Brown and Stenner’s (2009) is that it encourages a change in ontological perspec-
tive so that emotions can emerge in a complex, self-organizing fashion, between
bodies in social practices without looking for a new foundation (e.g. in the body,
aﬀect, psychoanalytic processes, social relations or some complex abstract nexus of
all these).
That aim is not so diﬀerent from the spirit of Wittgenstein’s (1953) description
of correct judgements of the occurrence of emotion as comprising rules that could
form a system: ‘What is most diﬃcult here is to put this indeﬁniteness, correctly
and unfalsiﬁed, into words’ (1953: 227). As noted, although the aﬀective turn may
appear to have thoroughly superseded the linguistic turn, Wittgenstein’s body of
work is not evoked here as a conservative authority in the face of radical endeav-
ours, but rather to remind us to challenge utterances that exceed the bounds of
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sense and to become aware of unexamined ‘pictures’ woven tightly into the nomen-
clature of ostensibly innovative theories. If this account seems unnecessarily
abstract then it is possible to imagine extending Wittgenstein’s remark about emo-
tion to descriptions of the formation of correct judgements of the emotional cli-
mate, mood or atmosphere of one’s own or another ethnic or national group (i.e.
how can we provide a complete account without ‘falsifying’ what we set out to
examine). Moreover, rather than examine how people must imagine the reality of
one or more ethno-national communities with which they have an aﬀective
(or other) allegiance, we might follow what has been described as Wittgenstein’s
‘third philosophical period’ (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004) and instead ask on what
grounds could someone reasonably deny that their community and its feelings
were real? And in such cases, might any identiﬁed feeling also be linked to ‘tech-
nologies that are allowing us both to ‘‘see’’ aﬀect and to produce aﬀective
bodily capacities beyond the body’s organic-physiological constraints’ (Clough,
2007: 2).
Some ﬁnal points will ﬂesh out my earlier remarks about Baldacchino’s new
theory resembling older ones. The model (or picture) underpinning the phenom-
enological-psychoanalytic account presents collective emotion as the transcendent
outcome of the possible relationships between ego-object (e.g. the ‘I’ in ‘I am deeply
ashamed of and reject Australian racism’) and the ‘we-image’ (the formal object of
collective sentiment). The subject here is both epiphenomenal and the mental object
of consciousness, rather like the ‘myself’ in ‘I pride myself on disowning all forms
of nationalism’, and it seems that it can potentially be experienced as needing to be
defended or evoking fear (e.g. ‘we pride ourselves on always winning or being
competitive in international sporting competitions’). In this regard, it is clearly a
more complex representation than theories in which the occurrence of ‘real group
level emotions’ must be mediated by a uni-dimensional personal identiﬁcation ‘var-
iable’ (see Smith et al., 2007). While it is also possible to speak of the experiences
and sensitivities of having an ‘extended self’ that confronts an unﬂattering
‘we-image’ generated by an opposing group, the same danger appears when repla-
cing descriptions of what collectives actually do to organize themselves (or a gen-
uine feeling of spontaneous apolitical, national unity) with the representation of the
collective that seem to be real. For reality can intrude in speciﬁc and contingent
forms: a national team may fail dismally; protestors can reveal ugly truths to an
international audience; externalized anger against migrants is eventually rejected by
the larger community; feelings of euphoria fade; and a nation’s socioemotional
resources are depleted as its economic strength declines. There must be room in
any account to experience a reality that seems to demand a change in one’s we-
image or realize the genuine risk of isolation. Intrusions of reality here could also
include powerfully emotional instances of genuine recognition of an ethnic minor-
ity by a majority group. While Baldacchino’s aim to bring together many diverse
theories and arguments is laudable, the resulting theoretical model bypasses rather
than transforms much of the similar conceptual and empirical work that has
already been carried out in the human sciences.
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